|
|
Comments to the Federal Trade
Commission
by the National Consumers League
concerning the Pay-Per-Call Rule Review
March 10, 1999
Office of the Secretary, Room 159
Federal Trade Commission
6th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20580
RE: Pay-Per-Call Rule
Review-Comment
File No.R611016
Dear Sir:
The National Consumers League
respectfully submits the enclosed comments to the Federal Trade
Commission in the matter cited above and will convey by separate notice
its desire to participate in the public workshop.
If there are any questions in this
regard, please contact me at (202) 835-3323. Thank you for the
opportunity to comment on this important issue.
Sincerely yours,
Susan Grant
Vice President for Public Policy
Comments to the Federal Trade Commission
by the National Consumers League
concerning the Pay-Per-Call Rule Review
FTC File No. R611016
Introduction
The National Consumers League
applauds the Federal Trade Commission's proposal to revamp the
Pay-Per-Call Rule to protect consumers from abuses in the sale of
audiotext services and misuse of the telephone billing system. One
hundred years ago, when the League was founded, no one could have
imagined the services that are available today through the telephone,
the many different ways that consumers can pay for them, or the
technology that makes it all possible. But the basic consumer issues
have not changed: informed choice; fair billing; and practical recourse
for disputes. It is with these principles in mind that we have reviewed
the proposed Rule and offer our comments.
NCL is a private, nonprofit
membership organization representing consumers in the marketplace and
the workplace. In 1992, the League responded to the growing menace of
telemarketing fraud by creating the National Fraud Information Center, a
unique hotline service. Through a toll-free number, 1-800-876-7060, or
the www.fraud.org web site launched in 1996, consumers can get advice
about telephone solicitations and report possible fraud. Fraud reports
are relayed to a database maintained by the Federal Trade Commission and
the National Association of Attorneys General. They are also transmitted
electronically to more than 160 federal, state and local law enforcement
agencies. This information alerts agencies to matters that may merit
investigation and helps them build their cases against fraudulent
operators.
In addition, and even more
important, the advice that consumers receive from the NFIC helps them
recognize the danger signs of fraud and avoid being victimized in the
future.
The League also promotes consumer
awareness about telemarketing fraud through other means -- its
www.nclnet.org web site, media interviews, coalitions such as the
Alliance Against Fraud in Telemarketing, which NCL coordinates, and
other public outreach activities.
Overall Telephone-Billed Fraud
Statistics
Since the inception of NCL's National Fraud Information Center program,
pay-per-call services have consistently ranked in the top 20 categories
of telemarketing fraud. Initially falling after the original Rule took
effect in 1993 from 8th place in 1992 to 15th place in 1993, and to a
low of 16th place in 1994, pay-per-call began to rise again in 1995. By
the end of 1998 it once again ranked as the 8th most frequent
telemarketing fraud reported to the NFIC.
Even more alarming is the surge of complaints in a new category,
cramming. Coined by the media in 1997, the word cramming refers to
third-party charges that appear (and often recur monthly) on consumers'
phone bills for services that they never requested such as voice mail,
paging, personal 800 numbers, or even non-telecommunications items like
club membership. Previously included in the pay-per-call category if
they were related to calls to pay-per-call services, these incidents
began to be tracked separately as cramming in the NFIC database in
October of 1997. By the end of 1998, cramming was the #1 telemarketing
fraud, with almost twice as many reports (2734) made to the NFIC as the
#2 two category, advance fee loans (1492), and nearly ten times more
than pay-per-call services (283). A chart illustrating the numbers of
pay-per-call and cramming complaints is attached to these comments.
Of all payments consumers reported making in connection with fraudulent
telemarketing transactions in 1998, 43 percent were via their telephone
bills (this reflects not only cramming and pay-per-call complaints but
slamming, which is unauthorized carrier switching). Clearly, the
telephone billing structure has become an attractive means of billing
and collection for a wide variety of services. Unfortunately, it has
also attracted a number of unscrupulous operators who are abusing the
system for fraudulent purposes. They have recognized loopholes and gaps
in the original Pay-Per-Call-Rule and capitalized on them.
Because of those loopholes and gaps, consumers who are victims of
telephone-billed fraud find themselves without the defenses and remedies
that the Rule provides. Therefore, it is crucial for the Rule to be
revamped to address not only continued deceptive acts and practices in
connection with traditional pay-per-call services but all
telephone-billed purchases (other than for normal local and toll
service).
Nature of Complaints
Before the deadline for comments in this matter was extended, NCL made a
detailed analysis of the pay-per-call complaints that the NFIC received
during the first eleven months of 1998. We also examined our November
1998 cramming complaints. Examples of the stories these consumers told
our counselors are attached to this testimony.
Pay-Per-Call Services Category
Of the 244 pay-per-call reports that we examined, 28 percent involved
the use of 800 numbers. Those complaints breaks down into three subsets.
In 12 percent, consumers were charged for 800 number pay-per-call
services that they accessed by calling 800 numbers, even though they had
no presubscription agreement. In fact, in most cases the consumers
believed that the 800 number calls were free, or that a certain number
of minutes were free, based on the advertisements to which they
responded.
In another 12 percent, consumers dialed 800 numbers and were either
connected to 900 numbers by following instructions to punch additional
numbers in on their telephone keypads or by some other means, or
instructed to hang up and dial 900 numbers to obtain the advertised
services, resulting in 900 number charges. We do not know if preamble
messages about 900 number charges were provided in any of the calls, but
even if they were, the consumers emphasized in their complaints that
they understood the calls would be free or that they would receive a
certain number of minutes free. An additional four percent of the 800
number-related complaints were about charges for international or other
toll calls that resulted from consumers dialing toll-free numbers.
The remaining pay-per-call complaints broke down as follows. In five
percent, consumers were charged for international or other toll calls
when they called the numbers without realizing that there would be such
charges; when children or others used their telephones without
permission to make the calls; or no one could have made the calls.
Twelve percent of the pay-per-call reports involved charges for collect
calls. In many instances, the consumers said they never accepted the
calls or that no one was home at the time. In some cases, consumers who
declined to accept the calls were connected anyway, usually to a
recorded message. One consumer was charged for a collect call that was
simply a message left on her answering machine. Some of these charges
were for domestic long-distance collect calls, others for calls from
other countries. When consumers disputed the charges, they were told
that they had agreed to be called collect as part of a pay-per-call
service to which they had subscribed -- a charge that they denied. One
person who accepted a call was led to believe that it was from the fire
department. Another thought that it was a friend or family member, but
when she accepted the call, there was no sound at all.
35 percent of the consumers who made pay-per-call reports said that they
were billed for dialing 900 numbers when they had not or that were
misrepresented as free. In some cases, consumers were billed for 900
number charges even though they had 900 number blocking.
In the remaining 20 percent of the pay-per-call complaints that we
reviewed, it was unclear whether consumers were charged for 900 number
calls, 800 number calls, or other types of calls. All they could tell
the NFIC counselors was that they were being billed for adult lines or
psychic services or some other type of information or entertainment, but
they were not sure exactly how the charges came about or how they were
described on their bills. One of the problems with telephone-billed
fraud is that many consumers have trouble understanding the different
kinds of charges that appear on their phone bills. A chart illustrating
the breakdown of the pay-per-call complaints is attached to these
comments.
Cramming Category
The 62 cramming reports that were made to the NFIC in November of 1998
break down into several categories. Eight percent of the consumers were
charged for calling cards that they neither asked for nor received.
Thirteen percent of the disputed charges were for long distance services
or plans that the consumers never requested or used. Despite the fact
that these consumers had not been slammed or used dial-around services,
they were charged for long-distance by companies they never heard of in
addition to the charges from their regular long-distance carriers.
Eighteen percent of the consumers were billed for voice mail services
they did not request. Another 11 percent of the cramming reports were
about charges for miscellaneous services -- personal 800 numbers,
Internet services, a dating service, a calling card privacy service, and
something described as a "value calling service."
In the remaining 50 percent, the consumers could not specify exactly
what the unauthorized services were for which they were being billed.
Again, consumers are very confused about the charges that appear on
their phone bills, which are often described as "monthly service fee" or
in similarly vague terms. A chart illustrating the breakdown of these
cramming complaints is attached to our comments.
When consumers disputed these charges, they were told that they had
signed up for the services by dialing an 800 number or 900 number
pay-per-call services such as psychic hotlines, by filling out a form,
or by agreeing to the terms of a telemarketing solicitation.
At the root of all the pay-per-call and cramming complaints is this
simple fact: all that is needed to place unauthorized charges on a
consumer's phone bill is the person's telephone number. Phone numbers
can be captured through Automatic Number Identification when someone
dials the telephone from the consumer's home or place of business,
harvested from contest entry forms, marketing lists and other materials,
or obtained directly from the telephone book. It is not necessary for
the consumer to actually make a call, though some victims are lured into
unwittingly dialing numbers that result in charges. In many cases there
is no ability to block the services to prevent such charges.
As a result, consumers have lost control of their telephone bills. If
the competitive marketplace for telecommunications services is to
flourish and benefit consumers, people must regain control of their
telephone bills and the potential for fraud must be eliminated.
Section 1. Questions for Comment on the Proposed Rule
General Questions
We have already provided statistics from the NFIC for the number and
nature of complaints concerning pay-per-call services and telephone
cramming. While we cannot comment on the economic cost that industry
incurs as a result of fraud or deception in those categories, we can
provide information about the costs to consumers. In the 1998
pay-per-call service complaints, the average amount in dispute per
person was $197; the average disputed amount in the cramming complaints
was $69.
Fortunately, many people contact our hotline for advice before they have
paid. Nonetheless, some people are intimidated into paying with threats
of collection or bad credit.
Questions on Proposed Specific Changes
Before we respond to specific questions that the FTC has posed, we would
like to note that "customer" as defined in Section 308.2 (e) generally
works well throughout the proposed Rule except in Section 308.4 on
advertising disclosures. The word "potential" or "prospective" should be
added before "customer" whenever it appears in this section because the
consumer has not acquired or been billed for the goods or services at
that point.
1. Unauthorized Charges
One of the most important proposed changes in the Rule is the definition
of what constitutes a billing error. As we have illustrated, there are
many different situations in which consumers are faced with charges on
their telephone bills for services they never requested and/or for which
they never agreed to pay. But under the current Rule they do not
necessarily have the same dispute rights in each instance. Moreover,
even when consumers do clearly have dispute rights under the Rule, they
sometimes find it difficult to assert them.
Presubscription agreements for 800 number charges are a good example of
this problem. Since there is no tangible proof that there is a
presubscription agreement between the vendor and the person whose
telephone bill will be charged, it is difficult for that consumer to
assert that no agreement existed or that the terms were falsely
represented. If the new Rule defines the elements of a valid
presubscription agreement, billing error should include instances in
which consumers contend that those elements were not met.
Consumers should also have the right to assert that there is a billing
error if they are billed for information or entertainment services
provided through international or other toll numbers. It is unreasonable
to expect them to block access to all international phone or other toll
numbers in order to protect themselves from those types of charges and
unfair to give them less recourse to dispute them than they have with
900 number charges.
We applaud the requirement for "express authorization" under the
proposed Rule which will enable consumers to dispute as billing errors
charges for voice mail, club memberships and other services they never
agreed to purchase. Again, since there is no blocking option that meets
the TDDRA criteria, there is no way for consumers to protect themselves
from being billed for unauthorized charges of these types. The mere fact
that there was a call from a consumer's telephone to a vendor, that
someone filled out a contest entry form, or that there was a
conversation between a telemarketer and someone at the consumer's number
does not constitute an agreement between the person responsible for the
telephone bill and the vendor.
Finally, in situations where consumers have taken advantage of their
ability to block 900 number access from their telephones, any charges on
their bills for 900 number calls must logically fall under the
definition of billing error.
2. PIN Number
Fraudulent and deceptive service providers have abused the PIN number in
the presubscription provisions of the current Rule in many ways: mailing
"activation" numbers to households where anyone might use them;
instructing consumers to provide their bank account numbers to verify
their identities and then withdrawing charges from their accounts
without authorization; or by prompting callers to punch in a code on
their telephone keypads in order to obtain the advertised services.
Currently there is no assurance when the charges will be assessed to a
phone number that the caller is the person who is responsible for the
telephone bill at that number, or that the person using the PIN number
understands that it will result in charges.
The Commission proposes to remedy this problem by requiring that to be
valid the PIN number must be requested by the consumer, provided only to
the person who will be billed for the service, and provided
simultaneously with a clear and conspicuous disclosure of all terms and
conditions associated with the presubscription agreement.
We are not sure exactly how this would work in the absence of a
requirement that the presubscription agreement must be signed by the
consumer. It is unclear how the vendor would show that the number was
requested, or home someone else at the address to which the PIN number
was sent would be prevented from using it.
To safeguard the PIN number, we believe that it should be provided to
the consumer after the written presubscription agreement has been sent,
not simultaneously with it. We suggest the following procedure. Upon
receipt of the agreement, the consumer would call an independent
third-party that has been retained by the vendor. Using live operators,
this company would verify that the person's name matches that on the
agreement and that the caller understands the terms. Only at that point
would the consumer be issued the PIN number. This would ensure that the
PIN number is truly "unique" to the individual.
This process may seem slightly burdensome, but we remind the Commission
that the presubscription agreement is intended as a narrowly drawn
exemption from the provisions of the Rule and protections that they
afford consumers.
3. Presubscription Agreement
We have long advocated for a written agreement signed by the buyer
because we believe that contracts for services, especially ongoing
services, should be made in such a way that they document clearly and
unambiguously the consumer's understanding of and consent to the terms.
The Commission has proposed instead to require the vendor to send what
is essentially a memorandum of understanding to the consumer who
requested the service. We agree that sending the consumer this
information would be helpful, but as we noted in our comments on PIN
numbers, it is crucial to verify that the person who has access to the
service is the person who is authorized to use it, at least when it is
first activated. If the consumer is obliged to contact a third-party
verifier to affirm the agreement and obtain the PIN number, this process
would be a reasonable alternative to the requirement for a signed
contract.
4. Service Bureau
We agree that the functions of service bureaus and billing aggregators
have broadened over time and that they play key roles in the
telecommunications marketplace, not just for audiotext services but for
other types of services that may be provided by telephone and/or for
which charges may be made to consumers' phone bills. They are the
bridges between the vendors, the carriers, and the ultimate consumers.
Therefore, they should share responsibility with the service providers
for those activities that fall under the provisions and requirements of
the Rule. It is also important to include common carriers when they
function in the same manner as described for service bureaus.
5. Pay-Per-Call Service
By proposing to include all audio entertainment and information services
in the definition of pay-per-call service, regardless of the dialing
patterns through which they are provided, the Commission has achieved a
simple solution to what has become a complicated problem. As we stated
in the public workshop which the Commission convened in June of 1997, it
is the service providers who have elected to expand the provision of
these types of services to international and other numbers that result
in toll charges; situations in which consumers do not receive the same
disclosures and do not have the same protection as when dialing patterns
are used that fall squarely under the current Rule.
Our concern, and the purpose of the Rule, is to ensure that consumers:
know how much they will pay for the service; understand the service that
will be provided; are able to control access to services that will
result in charges to them; and have the right to dispute charges for
such services without fear that their telephones will be disconnected or
their credit ruined.
As the old saying goes, "If it looks like a duck and quacks like a duck,
it's a duck." The Commission has correctly observed that the essential
characteristics of audiotext services are the same, no matter what
dialing pattern is used to provide them, and that the impact of fraud
and deception on consumers is also the same. What the Commission is
essentially saying is, "If it looks like a pay-per-call service and acts
like a pay-per-call service, it's a pay-per-call service. We heartily
agree.
It is also essential to include in the pay-per-call definition services
that are provided as a result of calls to consumers, not just from
consumers, since this is one of the ways that unauthorized service
charges originate
.
6. De Minimus Threshold for Pay-Per-Call Services
The Commission's proposal is reasonable; we certainly would not want to
set the threshold any higher. If some dialing patterns provide higher
margins of profit than others but would fall under provisions and
requirements of the Rule, it is up to the vendors to weigh the costs and
benefits and determine what types of lines they wish to use to provide
their services.
7. Rebuttable Presumption of Payment
We agree that it is fair to assume that the services are not being
provided without some renumeration being generated for the company that
provides them. Therefore, it should be up to vendor to rebut this
presumption if that is not the case.
8. Misrepresentation of Cost
The proposed provision concerning misrepresentation of cost addresses
some of the most egregious problems that we hear about concerning
pay-per-call services. Many of the complaints that the NFIC receives are
from consumers who called 900 number psychic hotlines and other
pay-per-call services in response to advertisements that misled them to
believe that the first call, or a portion of the call, was free. Others
were connected or directed from a "free" 800 number to a 900 number with
the same understanding. In some instances, consumers were left on hold
for long periods of time but were falsely led to believe that those
minutes did not count towards their "free" time.
Service providers should clearly be prohibited from misrepresenting the
costs of their services. Moreover, to ensure that consumers understand
when their free time is up, the Commission has proposed a solution that
we have advocated previously, to require a signal when the "free" time
is ending. It is unreasonable to expect consumers to stare at their
clocks and keep track of the time while they are obtaining information
or enjoying entertainment services. Furthermore, the potential for
disputed bills would be reduced if consumers were alerted to the fact
that charges are about to start. The same rationale for the required
signal at the end of the free preamble message applies here.
9. Beepers and Pagers
The NFIC receives complaints from consumers who incurred charges for
pay-per-call services as a result of responding to a beeper or a pager.
Even though consumers may not always recognize the number, they are
likely to respond because they naturally assume that there is an
emergency or the message is from someone they know.
Because we believe that most people use beepers and pagers for personal
and business communication or for emergencies, and do not expect to
receive messages on them from strangers, we think it is highly
inappropriate to solicit consumers for information or entertainment
services through those devices. The Rule should simply prohibit this
practice.
10. Nominal Cost Calls
We see no compelling reason to raise the threshold from $2 to $3. The
preamble message provides important information to consumers about the
services that will be provided and the cost. One call may result in
nominal charges, but it is not uncommon for consumers or others in their
households to make repeated calls within one billing period. Without the
service and cost information, there is no way to ensure that callers
understand what they are getting and what the service costs -- until the
bill arrives weeks later. Therefore, we do not support raising the
threshold and, correspondingly, the number of services that can be
accessed without the preamble message and the important information it
conveys.
11. Fractional Minute Billing
While we have no expertise in billing technology, we agree that it seems
unfair to continue to assess consumers for time-based services after
they have disconnected from the calls. If billing in less than one
minute increments is now technically feasible, the rule should be
changed as the Commission has proposed. As an alternative, the vendor
could be required to disclose in its advertisements and in the preamble
message if it rounds up the charge to the next minute.
12. Toll Charges
There is no benefit to consumers in accessing information and
entertainment services through numbers that result in toll charges. The
drawbacks for consumers, however, are significant. Since the charges
differ widely depending on consumers' long-distance calling plans, there
is no way for the service providers to inform them in advance how much
the services will cost.
Furthermore, since it is not feasible for consumers to block access to
long-distance services, there is no way for them to prevent household
members or others from making unauthorized calls for information or
entertainment services that will result in toll charges on their bills.
Billing disputes about toll charges also cause major problems for local
and long-distance carriers, who have no way of distinguishing toll calls
that are used to access pay-per-call services from other toll calls.
In proposing to prohibit audiotext services from being billed as toll
charges, the Commission has taken the only logical and sensible course
of action. Again, we remind the Commission that service providers have
other options. The Rule is not intended to guaranty service providers
the lowest cost or highest margin of profit. Rather, its purpose is to
ensure that consumers understand what services will be provided and how
much they will cost, and to give them reasonable dispute rights for
erroneous or unauthorized charges. There are no less restrictive means
to achieve that purpose.
13. Express Authorization
Express authorization is vital to the integrity of the telephone billing
system, but that integrity has been severely compromised. In 1997 only
19 percent of the payments that consumers reported to the NFIC in
connection with telemarketing fraud were made via their phone bills;
within a year that figure rose to 43 percent. The root of the problem is
the fact that anyone selling audiotext or other services can arrange
with a billing system operator to charge the person who is responsible
for the account at a specific telephone number, without any proof that
the person agreed to buy the services.
As a result, two equally troubling scenarios are possible. One is that
the person who is responsible for the bill to that telephone account is
not the same as the person who requested the service. The other is that
no one has requested the service and the charges are simply fictitious.
The NFIC hears from consumers about both scenarios. The burden is often
placed on the consumers to show that the services were not authorized; a
difficult burden to meet when no documentation of the agreement to
purchase the services is required.
We agree with the Commission that ANI cannot be used to document a
telephone-billed purchase. It does not show who made the call or what
the understanding was between the parties. However, we are troubled by
taped authorization because the NFIC has received many complaints from
consumers about both slamming and cramming in which they contend that a
taped conversation was altered to use a "yes" answer to a question
unrelated to purchase as proof that they agreed to do so. In some
instances the taped voice was not even that of the consumer or anyone
else in the household.
We also hear from consumers who say that as a result of someone filling
out a contest entry form, coupon promotion or other materials, they were
signed up for telephone-billed services without their knowledge or
consent.
We believe that all non-blockable telephone-billed purchases covered by
the proposed Rule should be verified by independent third parties
because it would be the most effective method of confirming express
authorization. This verification process could be conducted by the
consumer's local phone company or another entity contracted by the
service provider for that purpose. Furthermore, we suggest that the Rule
prohibit contest entry forms, checks and coupons from being used to
obtain express authorization for telephone-billed services.
14. Billing Statement Disclosures
For any telephone-billed purchases covered by the Rule, consumers' bills
should show the name and local or toll-free number of the entity that
has the responsibility and authority to answer questions and resolve
complaints concerning those charges. In addition, the address of that
entity should be included in case consumers have difficulty getting
through to busy lines and wish to make their complaints in writing, or
want to follow up a telephone conversation in writing.
We strongly disagree, however, that it is unnecessary to include the
vendor's name on the bill. Billing aggregators, service bureaus and
billing entities typically contract with many different vendors
simultaneously. Consumers have the right to know whose services they are
being billed for without having to make a call to find out. Furthermore,
both the local telephone companies, as operators of the billing systems,
and law enforcement agencies need to know the identity of the vendors in
order to detect patterns of abuse. The vendor's name could easily be
added to the bills after the information about how to reach the
inquiry/complaint handling entity.
15. Service Bureau Liability
The Commission's proposals for direct service bureau liability seem
sensible and fair in light of the direct roles they play in facilitating
telephone-billed transactions.
16. Billing Entity Liability
We believe that liability on the part of the billing entity is necessary
to eliminate the run-arounds and unresponsiveness that consumers
frequently encounter when they question telephone-billed charges. For
example, one woman who complained to the NFIC about cramming said that
when she got no satisfaction from the first person she spoke to at the
number listed on her phone bill and insisted on speaking to a
supervisor, another person came on the line and abruptly told her that
she had to hang up because "the building was on fire." In many
instances, consumers are put on hold for interminable lengths of time or
just get busy signals.
The Commission proposes to impose liability broadly. In the definitions,
a billing entity is anyone who transmits the billing statement or
assumes responsibility for receiving and responding to billing error
complaints and inquiries. Thus, the billing entity could be a vendor, a
service bureau or billing aggregator, a local telephone company, or
there could be multiple billing entities involved in the same
transaction.
We believe that it is appropriate for liability to be shared as the
Commission has proposed. Over the past several months, many of the local
telephone companies themselves have acknowledged their responsibilities
to consumers, particularly in cramming complaints. They have begun to
examine their internal systems to improve screening of vendors, service
bureaus and billing aggregators who seek their services. They have set
criteria for terminating billing relationships with companies about that
have generated unacceptable levels of complaints or violated other
provisions of their contracts. In addition, they are improving their own
handling of consumer complaints.
Billing aggregators have also worked together to develop voluntary
guidelines of conduct in regard to cramming. These efforts are voluntary
and not uniform. We would hope that the liability proposed by the
Commission would give even more momentum to this process and provide
guidance for developing standards of conduct in the industry.
However, we do have some concerns about how this shared liability would
work in regard to the billing error procedures. We will discuss this
issue further in our answers to Question 20.
17., 18. and 19. We have no opinions on these questions for the
industry.
20. Reasonable Investigation
We will use this section of our comments to focus not only on the issue
of reasonable investigation but on other aspects of the proposed dispute
resolution procedure. Many of the consumers who contact the NFIC are
confused about how to resolve disputes concerning telephone-billed
purchases, especially since so many different entities may be involved.
Some, out of fear that their telephone service will be disconnected or
that their credit will be ruined, have already paid the charges even
though they believe that the services were unauthorized or
misrepresented. Many consumers complain that they were threatened or
intimidated. The "proof" that they are given when they question
authorization for the services is sometimes fabricated, or no
documentation is provided at all.
We believe that the dispute procedure must be easy for consumers to
follow, that the burden of the proof must rest with the vendor to show
that services were authorized, and that consumers must be protected from
inappropriate collection activities.
One point of potential confusion for consumers is exactly who they
should notify about billing errors. In the background information about
the proposed dispute resolution procedures, the Commission notes that
the billing entity will usually be the local telephone company. But
under the proposed definitions, other parties may also be considered
billing entities, depending on their functions. The Commission proposes
that where there are multiple billing entities, the parties must decide
which of them is responsible for receiving and responding to billing
errors. Thus, it is possible that the entity consumers would notify
under Section 308.20 could be a vendor, a service bureau or a billing
aggregator, not the local telephone company.
This scenario raises serious concerns. First, if the dispute is being
investigated by another billing entity, the local telephone company may
be unaware that the consumer intends to withhold payment for the charges
in question. It is also important for the local telephone company to
know about possible problems with vendors and others with whom it has
contractual relationships.
Second, if the entity that the consumer notifies about the billing error
does not fulfill its responsibility to investigate it, the clock
continues to tick. How would the consumer prove that the billing entity
was notified within the 60-day time limit if that entity denied it
later?
One obvious solution to these problems would be to require the billing
entity responsible for handling billing errors to notify all other
billing entities of the dispute, but this would place too much reliance
on an entity that may be fraudulent. Or the billing disclosures could
instruct the consumer to file notice of an error with both the entity
listed on the bill for that purpose and the local telephone company, if
they are not one and the same. But this would place more burden on
consumers than may be appropriate.
The most simple and reliable procedure would be to require the entity
that transmits the bill to the customer be the point of contact for
billing errors. That entity would have the responsibility to transmit
the information upstream to either the vendor or an agent for the
vendor, depending on how those relationships are arranged, and to
transmit the response back to the consumer. All of the entities involved
would still share liability for compliance with the provisions of the
Rule.
This standardized procedure would also make it easier to educate
consumers about how to deal with disputes concerning telephone-billed
purchases. It places a burden on the local telephone companies, but it
is a burden that they already shoulder, since many consumers contact
their local telephone companies when they find unauthorized charges on
their bills, even if their bills instruct them to contact another
entity. The costs associated with these functions can be built into the
contracts between the local telephone companies and the vendors or their
agents.
Moreover, this procedure would ensure that all parties are made aware of
the billing dispute and that collection activities are halted pending
investigation, an important provision of the proposed Rule. To clarify
how the process works, a definition for "primary billing entity" would
be required.
We strongly support other provisions of this section concerning the
consumer's ability to withhold payment for disputed charges, the
requirement to provide documentation of disputed charges that are deemed
valid, and the limits on relaying information about disputed charges to
credit reporting agencies. They are vital to protect consumers from
abusive collection practices.
However, we are not sure that the 60-day time limit for disputing
charges will adequately protect consumers from liability to pay
unauthorized charges that are "crammed" onto their phone bills. Many of
these charges are relatively small, ranging between $3.95 and $19.95, so
they are not always noticed by consumers right away. The fact that the
disputed amount per person for cramming complaint averaged $69 last year
indicates that it may be several months before consumers realize that
these fraudulent charges have been added to their bills. Therefore, we
believe that the dispute period should run from the time that the
consumer first discovers the problem or from the most recent bill on
which the charge appeared.
21. Evidence of Debt
The fact that telephone-billed purchases have been delivered does not
prove that they were made by the person who receives the bill,
especially if the evidence is simply based on ANI. The NFIC receives
complaints from consumers who have been charged for unsolicited calling
cards, collect calls that they never accepted, or 900 number calls they
never made. In any investigation of a dispute, proof of delivery is one
factor to look at but it is not necessarily determinative of whether the
debt is valid, particularly for non-blockable services or in instances
where a block was requested but failed to stop the charges from being
put through for payment.
22. TDDRA Blocking
Some consumers complain that they have been charged for 900 number calls
even though they requested blocks from their local telephone companies.
We know from discussions with industry members that it is possible to
forward fictitious transaction reports to the local telephone companies
for billing and collection. Thus it is very important for the local
exchanges to keep accurate records of when TDDRA blocking has been put
into place and to make those records easily available to the consumer,
law enforcement agencies, and the other entities involved in a billing
error dispute concerning charges for services that were supposedly
blocked.
23. Applicability of
Third-Party Debt Collectors
Third-party debt collectors should stand in the same shoes as the vendor
and other entities involved in a telephone-billed transaction in terms
of their responsibilities to consumers to investigate billing errors and
to cease collection activities.
Conclusion
We appreciate the care and thoroughness with which the Commission staff
has examined problems with the sale of audiotext services and abuses in
the telephone billing system. This review has been a long process and we
hope that it will not be necessary to revisit the Rule again for several
years. That is why we urge the Commission to take the strongest possible
action now. Thank you very much for considering our views and
suggestions. For further information about our stance on these issues,
please do not hesitate to contact me at (202) 835-3323.
Respectfully submitted,
Susan Grant, Vice President
for Public Policy
National Consumers League
1701 K Street NW, Suite 1200
Washington, DC 20006
|